Wilfred A. Rogalski v. Phillips Petroleum Company : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1953
Wilfred A. Rogalski v. Phillips Petroleum Company
: Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy; David E. Salisbury; Milton A. Oman; Attorneys for
Plaintiff and Respondent;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Rogalski v. Phillips Petroleum Co., No. 7982 (Utah Supreme Court, 1953).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1959
In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
Fit,EJ) 
--- AUG 2 d r~5J 
iWILFRED A. ROGALSKI, 
·· · Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
PHILLIPS 'PETROLEUM COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant and A~pellant. 
Case No. 
7982 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY, 
DAVID E. SALISBURY, 
MILTON A. OMAN, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
AIIIIOW Pll-• &\LT LAKI RECEIVED 
SEP 28 1953 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ..... 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I THIS CASE WAS PROPERLY SUB-
MITTED TO THE JURY- THE EVIDENCE 
CLEARLY ESTABLISHED THAT PLAIN-
TIFF WAS A BUSINESS VISITOR AND 
THAT DEFENDANT HAD VIOLATED THE 
DUTY OF CAR~ OWED TO SUCH A PER-
Page 
1 
2 
7 
8 
SON....................................... 8 
a. Plaintiff was a business visitor on defend-
ant's premises at the time and place he was 
injured . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
b. Defendant violated the duty of care owed to 
one in plaintiff's status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 
POINT II PLAINTIFF WAS NOT GUILTY OF 
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MAT-
TER OF LAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 
POINT III THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR 
IN THE EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE 34 
POINT IV THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR 
IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY OR IN_ RE-
FUSING TO SUBMIT DEFENDANT'S RE-
QUESTED INSTRUCTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 
POINT V THERE WAS NO DEFECT IN PAR-
TIES- THIS ACTION WAS AUTHORIZED 
BY AND BROUGHT IN BEHALF OF THE 
PLAINTIFF AND THE STATE INSURANCE 
FUND ..................................... 45 
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
·\ 
TABLE OF CONTENTS-Continued 
Page 
CASES CITED 
Baker v. Decker, ... Utah ... 212 P. 2d 679 (1949). . 30 
Cederloff v. Whited, 110 Utah 45, 169 P. 2d 777 
(1946) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 
Eklund v. Kapitos, 216 Minn. 79, 11 N. W. 2d 805 
(1943) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 
Elswood v. Oregon Short Line Railroad Company, 82 
Utah 235, 23 P. 2d 925 (1933) . . . . . 26 
Hayward v. Downing, 112 Utah 508, 189 P. 2d 442 
(1948) ................................. 12, 14, 17 
Jay v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 150 F. 2d 24 7 
(lOth Cir. 1945) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 
Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co., 107 Utah 114, 152 
P. 2d 98 (1944) ............................ . 47 
Klinginsmith v. Allen, 155 Neb. 674, 53 N. W. 2d -~ 
77 (1953) ..................... . 41 ~ 
Knox v. Snow, ... Utah ... , 229 P. 2d 874 (1951). . 29 .J 
Larkin v. Saltair Beach Co., 30 Utah 86, 83 Pac. 
686 (1905) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 l 
Litt v. Litt, 75 Cal. App. 2d 242, 170 P. 2d 684 (1946) . . 41 1 
Martin v. Jones, . . . Utah ... , 253 P. 2d 359 4 
( 1953) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 25, 30 
Martin v. Stevens, ... Utah ... , 243 P. 2d 747 
(1952) ........................... ,· . . . 26,34 
Minder v. Rowley, 35 Wash. 2d 92, 211 P. 2d 170 
(1949) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 
Nevada Transfer & Warehouse Co. v. Peterson, 60 
Nev. 87, 99 P. 2d 633 (1940) 12, 17 I 
Newton v. Oregon Short Line Railroad Co., 43 Utah 
219, 134 Pac. 567 ( 1913) 34 ~ 
I 
-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS-Continued 
Page 
Oettinger v. Stewart, 24 Cal. 2d 122, 148 P. 2d 19 
(1944) ................. ' ·.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 
Parry v. Harris, 93 Utah 317, 320, 72 P. 2d 1044 
(1937) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 
Perl v. Cohodas, Peterson, Paoli, Nast Co., 295 Mich. 
325, 294 N. W. 697 (1940) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 
Skerl v. Willow Creek Coal Co., 92 Utah 474, 69 
P. 2d 502 ( 1937) ........................ 14, 42, 44 
Stickle v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., ... Utah ... , 
251 P. 2d 867 (1952) ......................... 9, 33 
" Swift and Company v. Schuster, 192 F. 2d 615 (lOth · 
Cir. 1951) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 
Tillotson v. City of Davenport, 232 Iowa 44, 4 N. 
w. 2d 365 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 
In re Wimmer's Estate, 111 Utah 444, 182 P. 2d 
119 (1947) .................... 10, 12, 14, 17, 21, 42 
TEXTS CITED 
Annotation, 157 A. L. R. 1242 at p. 1252 ........... . 49 
38 Am. Jur. Negligence, Section 199 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 
53 Am. Jur. Trial, Section 106 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 
Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Pro-
cedure, Section 655, Vol. 2, page 346 . . . . . . . . . . 35 
65 C. J. S., Negligence, Section 43(3)b ....... , .... 17 
Prosser on Torts, Section 35 
Prosser on Torts, Section 36 
Prosser on Torts, Section 79 ........... . 
Restatement, Torts, Section 332 .................. . 
23 
27 
12 
11 
Restatement, Torts, Section 342 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 
Restatement, Torts, Section 343 .............. 14, 20, 28 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS-Continued 
STATUTES CITED 
Section 42-1-58 U. C. A. (1943) 
Section 31-7-11 U. C. A. (1953) 
Page 
46 
48 
Section 35-1-65 U. C. A. (1953) . . . . . . . . . . . ... 46,48 
Rule 26 (d) U. R. C. P. . . . . . . . . . 35 
Rule 26 (e) U. R. C. P. . . . . . . . . 35 
-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
WILFRED A. ROGALSKI, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
7982 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a judgment on a verdict re-
covered by plaintiff, Wilford A. Rogalski, for personal in-
juries sustained on January 18, 1952. Plaintiff was in-
jured while working on and about property owned and 
maintained by defendant, Phillips Petroleum Company, at 
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Woods Cross, Utah. At the time he was injured, plaintiff 
was engaged in steam cleaning a truck owned and oper-
ated by his employer, Parley_ Droubay, a distributor of de-
fendant's products. While so engaged, plaintiff stumbled 
into an op~n vat containing hot caustic soda, kept on its 
premises by the defendant. 
The cas·e was submitted to a jury with appropriate 
instructions as to the definition of a business visitor or in-
vitee and the duty of care owed to such a person. The jury 
was specifically instructed that it could find for the plain-
tiff only if it first determined that he was a business visitor 
upon the defendant's property. The jury returned a verdict 
in plaintiff's favor. 
This action was brought with specific authorization 
of the State Insurance Fund and upon the understanding 
that the State Insurance Fund would be reimbursed, in the 
event of recovery, for the compensation payments made 
by it to the plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 18, 1952, plaintiff was an employee of one 
Parley Droubay (R. 55). His job was to drive the trucks 
in which defendant's products were distributed and to help 
repair and clean said trucks (R. 55, 56, 121). Prior to the 
acquisition of the Wasatch Oil Company facilities at Woods 
Cross, Utah, by defendant, Phillips Petroleum Company, 
Parley Droubay worked as a supervisory employee of 
Wasatch Oil Company, in charge of that company's trucks 
(R. 58) . At that time, Droubay used the concrete washing 
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ramp, where the plaintiff was injured, to wash Wasatch 
Oil Company trucks (R. 59). In so doing he used the same 
steam cleaning equipment as was being used by the plain-
" tiff at the time he was injured (R. 59). When defendant 
took over these facilities, Droubay purchased some of its 
trucks and since that time has acted as a consignee and 
distributor of defendant's products (R. 33). 
Droubay has been referred to as a "distributing agent" 
(R. 90). There is and was, at the time of plaintiff's in-
jury, a close business relationship between Droubay and 
defendant (R. 33). Products ar~ consigned by defendant 
to Droubay who distributes and sells them under defend-
ant's trade name. 
Droubay leases from defendant an office and parking 
area which are located on the east side of the defendant's 
maintenance building (R. 84). The washing ramp in ques-
tion is located on the south side of the same building (R. 
37). The office and parking area leased by defendant to 
Droubay, the pumps and docks where Droubay's trucks 
are loaded with defendant's products, and the washing 
ramp in question are all located in the same enclosed yard 
(R. 36) . He also had a right of way 50 feet wide leading 
in from the street (R. 89) . Droubay had never felt that he 
was confined in his operations to any particular area of 
defendant's yard (R. 112-113). 
Droubay, as noted above, used the washing ramp for 
cleaning trucks while an employee of Wasatch Oil Com-
pany and continued to so use the ramp and cleaning equip-
ment after the defendant took over the property (R. 58, 
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59) . Defendant acquiesced in and permitted the use of 
this ramp by Droubay for a period of almost three years 
prior to the time plaintiff was injured (R. 60). Defendant 
had at no time excluded Droubay from the use of this ramp 
or objected to his use of the same, although it was practic-
ally the only place used by him for washing his trucks 
(R. 60, 91). While on one occasion, Droubay was said to 
have been refused a specific permit or agreement by one of 
defendant's employees to use this ramp, he was not told 
that he could not use it and in fact continued to so use it 
with the acquiescence and knowledge of the defendant until 
the date plaintiff was injured (R. 201). Droubay did not 
even recall whether the request for permission included 
the washing ramp (R. 116). 
Droubay's trucks are painted with defendant's black 
and orange colors. The trade name of defendant, "Phillips 
66," appears on the sides of said trucks (R. 60, 117). This 
provides a source of advertising for defendant's products 
and the appearance of these trucks is naturally important 
to the defendant. Defendant's Sales Department had told 
Droubay that he should keep these trucks clean (R. 117). 
It was while cleaning one of these trucks that plaintiff 
sustained the injuries complained of in this case. i~ 
On the day of the injury, plaintiff was requested by 
Droubay to drive one of his trucks onto the washing ramp 
or platform so that it could be cleaned (R. 124). Prior to 
that day plaintiff had never been on the washing platform 
or in its vicinity (R. 127). This washing ramp is bordered 
on the left side by defendant's maintenance shop and 
to the front by a sliding door leading into defendant's 
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maintenance warehouse (R. 37, 68, Def's. Ex. 1). The 
steam cleaning equipment was on the left side of the ramp 
and the vat containing the caustic soda solution was on the 
right side of the ramp near the front (R. 38). Pumps and 
other objects cluttered the rest of the area to the right of 
the ramp (R. 126, 127, 142). Plaintiff was told by his 
employer that in driving onto the ramp, he should watch 
carefully to the left in order to avoid splashing on the 
windows of defendant's building (R. 124). After parking 
the truck on the ramp, he got out of the left-hand side and 
departed from the area to do some other work elsewhere 
(R. 125). He did not see the caustic soda vat at that time 
(R. 127). 
The concrete slab or washing ramp on which the truck 
was parked is 13 feet 11 inches in width and 61 feet 4 
inches in length (R. 101). The truck is 7 feet 1 inch in 
width from the outside fenders and 38 feet 11 inches in 
length (R. 101). While the exact location of the truck was 
not definitely established, there was approximately 3 to 6 
feet in front of the truck and from 1 foot to 18 inches on 
the right side between the truck and the edge of the 
_ cement (R. 125, 102, 155). The vat was located just 2 
inches from the right-hand edge of the ramp and near the 
front (R. 139), and it would therefore have been no more 
-· than 20 inches, at the most, from the right-hand side of the 
truck. It stood from 13 to 14 inches in height above the 
level of the ramp or about the same height as a man's shins 
(R. 38, 143) . The vat was never used by Droubay or his 
e¥Iployees in the cleaning of the trucks or otherwise (R. 
61). It was customary for Droubay to ask permission of 
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some of defendant's employees to use the washing ramp, 
but he did not recall for certain whether this customary 
practice had been followed on the day in question (R. 86). 
After lunch, plaintiff and Droubay returned to the 
washing ramp and Droubay started the steam cleaning 
equipment and showed the plaintiff how . to operate the 
same (R. 69, 70). Plaintiff had never operated this type 
of equipment prior to this date (R. 127). It was a fairly 
cool day in January and the steam cleaning equipment pro-
duced a great deal of steam and vapor, obscuring one's 
vision for some distance (R. 131). Steam also continued 
to rise from parts of the truck previously cleaned, due to 
the heat having been applied to the cold metal (R. 165). 
Plaintiff had cleaned the undercarriage on the front 
end of the truck and was proceeding around the front 
right-hand fender to clean the right side of the truck. His 
right hip was touching the side of the truck (R. 132). His 
vision was impaired by the steam from the cleaning ap-
paratus (R. 132, 169). In walking around the fender, 
plaintiff's foot came in contact with the side of the vat 
causing him to lose his balance and stumble forward, and 
in regaining his balance he put his left foot into the caus-
tic soda solution (R. 132, 133). Plaintiff, at that time, was 
not aware of the existence of this vat or of its contents (R. 
133). There was no cover on the vat at the time and it 
contained no barricade, warning or markings which would 
indicate to one using ·the premises the presence of this 
condition (R. 75). Plaintiff was not warned by any of 
defendant's agents or employees of this hazard (R. 128) · 
Even had he noticed the vat when he parked the truck on 
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the ramp, there was nothing to have warned him of its 
dangerous propensities or that it was different from the 
other empty tanks or objects placed in that area (R. 127). 
This suit was instituted with the oral consent and 
authorization of the State Insurance Fund. Prior to the 
filing of an answer in this action, a formal letter from 
David C. Thomas, Manager of the State Insurance Fund, 
was filed (R. 9) . This letter stated in part: 
"You are authorized to represent the interest 
of the State Insurance Fund in attempting to pro-
cure the rei~bursement to the Fund for the amounts 
which the State Insurance Fund has been required 
to pay in this case, it being our understanding that 
Mr. Rogalski's accident was caused by the fault 
of a third party." 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THIS CASE WAS PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO 
THE JURY - THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY 
ESTABLISHED THAT PLAINTIFF WAS A 
BUSINESS VISITOR AND THAT DEFEND-
ANT HAD VIOLATED THE DUTY OF CARE 
OWED TO SUCH A PERSON. 
POINT II. 
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT GUILTY OF CONTRI-
BUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF 
LAW. 
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POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN THE 
EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN IN-
STRUCTING THE JURY OR IN REFUSING 
TO SUBMIT DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTIONS. 
POINT V. 
THERE WAS NO DEFECT IN PARTIES -
THIS ACTION WAS AUTHORIZED BY AND 
BROUGHT IN BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF 
AND THE STATE INSURANCE FUND. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THIS CASE WAS PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO 
THE JURY - THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY 
ESTABLISHED THAT PLAINTIFF WAS A 
BUSINESS VISITOR AND THAT DEFEND-
ANT HAD VIOLATED THE DUTY OF CARE 
OWED TO SUCH A PERSON. 
It is difficult to differentiate in appellant's argument 
(Point I) as to whether it is concerning itself with the ques-1 
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tion of whether the case was properly submitted to the jury 
as to defendant's negligence, in violating the duty of care 
owed plaintiff, or to the question of whether the plaintiff 
was himself negligent. As the latter question is discussed 
subsequently, we will conce.rn ourselves first with the issue 
of defendant's negligence. 
The question before this Court, of course, is not whether 
the facts disclose negligent conduct on the part of the de-
fendant, but only whether there was sufficient evidence 
from which the jury could make su~h a finding. If there 
was any evidence from which a jury could reasonably find 
that plaintiff was a business visitor and that defendant 
had violated the duty of care owed to such a person, then 
the judgment of the trial court must be affirmed. Stickle 
v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., . . . Utah ... , 251 P. 2d 
867, 870 (1952). 
The questions to be determined are, first, whether or 
not there was any evidence from which a jury could infer 
that plaintiff was a business visitor upon defendants prem-
ises at the time he was injured and second, if he was a 
business visitor, whether or not defendant violated the duty 
of care owed to such a person. 
(a) Plaintiff was a business visitor on de-
fendant's premises at the time and 
place he was injured. 
Various terms are used in classifying those who 
are injured while upon the property of another. The terms 
"invitee," "business invitee" and "business visitor," as 
used by the plaintiff in the record all refer to the same 
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classification. Since this Court has adopted the classifica-
tion used in the Restatement of the Law of Torts-tres-
passer, licensee' and business visitor-these terms will be 
employed in this brief. In re Wimmer's Estate, 111 Utah 
444, 449, 182 P. 2d 119, 121 (1947). 
Plaintiff alleged, in his complaint, that he was a busi-
ness visitor. This was specifically denied in defendant's 
answer (R. 1, 16). There was no other issue raised by the 
pleadings as to plaintiff's status. Based upon the evidence 
submitted at the trial, the Court instructed the jury on this 
theory. The jury was specifically instructed that in order 
for plaintiff to recover, it must first be determined that 
he was a business visitor (R. 247). This inst~uction was 
very favorable to the defendant since, under the evidence 
disclosed at the trial and in light of the recent pronounce-
ments of this Court, the plaintiff probably was entitled to 
recover even though he was not a business visitor. See 
Martin v. Jones, ... Utah ... , 253 P. 2d 359 (1953) in 
which a judgment denying recovery to a trespasser was 
reversed by this Court where defendant's employees knew 
of his presence and failed to warn him of a known danger-
ous condition. Under the Court's instructions in the pres-
ent case, the definition of and duty of care owed to a 
licensee or trespasser was immaterial since the plaintiff's 
case depended upon a finding that he was a business visitor. 
The defendant urges • upon this Court a very artificial 
and untenable conception of what constitutes a business 
visitor. It is defendant's contention that the plaintiff's 
status must be determined with a tape measure, based upon 
the number of feet the place he was injured was from the 
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point at which business was actually transacted, or whether 
or not money was actually paid by the plaintiff (or his em-
ployer) to be where he was, or whether or not he had been 
expressly invited to enter the particular area in question. 
Not a single legal authority is cited for the proposition that 
the above factors are determinative. The very enlightening 
.... pronouncements of this Court on the subject are astutely 
ignored in appellant's brief. 
The Restatement of the Law of Torts defines a busi-
ness visitor as follows : 
"A business visitor is a person who is invited 
or permitted to enter or remain on land in the pos-
session of another for a purpose directly or indirect-
ly connected with business dealings between them." 
Restatement, Torts, § 332 (1934). 
The following comments accompany this definition : 
"Business visitors fall into two classes. The 
first class includes persons who are invited or per-
mitted to come upon the land for a purpose directly 
or indirectly connected with the business which the 
possessor conducts thereon * * * the second 
class includes those who come upon the land for a 
purpose which is connected with their own business 
which itself is directly or indirectly connected with 
any purpose, business or otherwise, for which the 
possessor uses the land. Restatement, Torts, Vol. 
2, p. 897. 
"It is immaterial that the person is one whom 
the possessor is not willing to receive as a business 
visitor if the possessor's words or other conduct are 
understood, and would be understood by a reason-
able man, as indicating the possessor's willingness. 
The nature of the use to which the possessor puts his 
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land is often sufficient to express to the reasonable 
understanding of the . public or classes or members 
thereof a wl.llingness or unwillingness to receive 
them. Restatement, Torts, Vol. 2, p. 898. 
"It is not necessary that the visitor's purpose 
be to enter into immediate business dealings with 
the possessor. The benefit to the possessor may be 
indirect and in the future." Restatement, Torts, 
Vol. 2, p. 899. 
The Restatement definition has been adopted and ap-
proved by this Court. In re Wimmer's Estate, 111 Utah 
444, 449, 182 P. 2d 119, 121 (1947) ; for a similar definition · 
see Prosser on Torts, Section 79. 
Under the above definition, two elements are necessary 
for one to obtain the status of a business visitor. First, he 
must be invited or permitted to enter or remain upon the 
premises of another and secondly, he must be there for a 
purpose directly or indirectly connected with the business 
dealings between them. The two elements are necessarily 
related and the greater the mutual benefit, the easier it is 
to infer the invitation or permission. Nevada Transfer & 
Warehouse Co. v. Peterson, 60 Nev. 87, 99 P. 2d 633, 636 
(1940). 
It is clear from this definition and the decisions of 
this Court that the invitation to enter upon the premises 
may be implied as well as express. See Hayward v. Down-
ing, 112 Utah 508, 513, 189 P. 2d 442, 444 (1948) in which 
this Court in referring to a business visitor or invitee stated 
"he may be· expressly invited to come upon the premises, 
but more commonly his invitation is implied." It is also 
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sufficient if the person is only permitted, as contrasted 
with invited, to be upon the property. The California 
Supreme Court in Oettinger v. Stewa1·t, 24 Cal. 2d 122, 148 
P. 2d 19, 21 (1944) has said: 
"An invitation or permission to enter upon land 
need not be express but may be implied from such 
circumstances as the conduct of the possessor, the 
arrangement of the premises, or local custom." 
Turning then to the facts of this case, there was abund-
ant evidence to support a finding of such an invitation . 
. There is no question but that the status of plaintiff and 
Droubay, his employer, were the same, since at the time of 
his injury, plaintiff was acting under the direction of and 
in behalf of Droubay. See Perl v. Cohodas, Peterson, Paoli, 
Nast Co., 295 Mich. 325, 294 N. W. 697, 700 (1940). As 
to the area where Droubay, plaintiff's employer, parked 
and loaded his trucks with defendant's products and other 
places on defendant's premises where business was actually 
transacted, there is no question but that plaintiff was a 
business visitor. As to those areas, the invitation was ex-
press and the mutual benefit obvious beyond doubt. Does 
this status change when the plaintiff, or his employer, is 
using the washing ramp or platform which is located in the 
same enclosed yard although admittedly some 100 to 150 
feet from the pumps and loading docks? This Court has, on 
several occasions, indicated that where there is an invita-
tion to enter part of one's premises or to enter one's prem-
ises generally, the question as to the extent or scope of this 
invitation and as to what portions of the property the in-
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vitation affects is one of foreseeability as to where the 
business visitor might reasonably be expected to go. 
Hayward v. Downing, supra, at page 445; 
Skerl v. Willow Creek Coal Company, 92 Utah 
474, 483, 69 P. 2d 502 (1937). 
And in In re Wimmer's Estate, supra, at page 4~1, it is 
stated: 
"A business visitor does not become a tres-
passer merely because his injury occurs while he is 
not at the very place he is working. He is entitled to 
use such other parts of the premises as necessary or 
reasonably incidental to the work he is required to 
perform. The deceased was not only entitled to use 
the area where he was actually carrying on his work, 
he was also entitled, without losing his status as a 
business visitor, to use such other places on the prem-
ises as would have some reasonable connection with 
his work * * · * " 
In the comment to Restatement of the Law of Torts, 
Sec. 343 dealing with the liability owed to a business visitor 
it is provided : 
'4 
i 
"Where it is customary that customers or pat-
rons shall be free to go to certain parts of the prem-
ises, the customer or patron is a business visitor 
thereon unless the possessor exercises reasonable 
care to apprise the customer or patron that the 
area of invitation is more narrowly restricted."~ 
Comment (b) . 
Whether or not plaintiff was invited or permitted to 
use the area where he was injured was a question of fact, 
properly submitted to the jury. 
Skerl v. Willow Creek Coal Co., supra, at pages 482, 
483. 
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The following facts in this case conclusively support the 
finding of the jury of an invitation or implied permission 
on the part of the defendant to let Droubay and his em-
ployees use this washing ramp and equipment: 
1. The customary practice of obtaining permission. 
Droubay, a witness, obviously friendly to defendant (R. 
111) testified that it was his customary practice to ask 
and receive permission from some of defendant's employees 
in the building adjacent to the ramp, to use the same (R. 
86). Droubay could not recall whether or not on this par-
ticular date such permission had been obtained (R. 86). 
Defendant offered no evidence to the effect that such per-
mission had not been requested and granted on the day 
plaintiff was injured. The jury could reasonably have in-
ferred from this "customary practice" that this same prac-
tice was followed on the day in question and that permis-
sion was expressly obtained. Where express permission is 
given, the question of benefit to the owner, discussed sub-
sequently, becomes less important. 
2. The continued use by Droubay and his employees of 
this ramp for washing their trucks. As indicated in the 
comment to Restatement, Torts, Sec. 332, an invitation 
may be implied from "local custom or persistent course of 
conduct." See also comment to Restatement, Torts, Sec. 
343, quoted supra. No evidence was introduced at the trial 
to show lack of knowledge, on the part of defendant, of 
Droubay's continued use of this ramp after defendant took 
over the Woods Cross facility. On the contrary, one of de-
fendant's officials admitted to have had knowledge of such 
use (R. 201). Droubay used the ramp on an average of 
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every six weeks for each of its five trucks or a total use of 
approximately three times per month. Never during this en. 
tire time had defendant objected to this use (R. 60). What 
clearer evidence could be produced to show that defendant 
permitted and acquiesced in the use of this area by Drou-
bay? At any time had it so desired, defendant could have 
prohibited this conduct. Defendant attempted to rebutt 
this argument by showing that Droubay had paid to have 
his trucks cleaned elsewhere, but the only instance testified 
to occurred subsequent to the commencement of this action 
(R. 91). That an invitation may be implied from continued 
use and failure of the defendant to post signs or otherwise 
prohibit said use, see Eklund v. Kapitos, 216 Minn. 79, 11 
N. W. 2d 805 (1943). 
3. The location of the ramp and its prior use. The 
jury could reasonably have inferred from the location of 
this ramp that Droubay was impliedly invited to use it. 
It was located in the same enclosed yard as Droubay used 
to load his trucks and it was in the same area as the office 
building and parking area, leased by defendant to Drou-
bay (R. 36). The exact location of the parking area was 
not fixed by the lease or established at trial, although its 
dimensions were given. Droubay had never been lead to 
1 
believe that he was confined in his operations to any par- , 
ticular area of defendant's premises (R. 112-113). Its 
convenient location, coupled with the fact that Droubay 
had used the ramp while an employee of Wasatch Oil Com- , 
pany prior to defendant's purchase of the property, could 
reasonably have lead him to believe that he was permitted 
and invited to continue using the same. At the time de-
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fendant purchased this property and sold its trucks to Drou-
bay, it could easily have given notice that he should hence-
forth cease using it. So far as this record is concerned, 
defendant did not do so. This implied invitation is further 
strengthened by the close business relationship existing 
between Droubay and defendant together with the mutual 
benefit derived from Droubay's continued use of the ramp. 
Some authorities have taken the view that if the de-
fendant benefits from the plaintiff's presence upon its prop-
erty, this is alone sufficient to support a finding of an 
implied invitation. 65 C. J. S., Negligence, Sec. 43 (3)b. 
See Hayward v. Downing, Supra, at page 445, in which 
benefit to the defendant was used to support the conten-
tion that there was an invitation to the particular area 
where the plaintiff was injured. See also, Nevada Trans-
fer & Warehouse Co. v. Peterson, Supra. 
As to the question of mutual benefit, it is clear under 
the above definition that in order for a person to be classi-
fied as a business visitor, his presence upon the property 
need only indirectly benefit the owner. See In re Wimmer's 
Estate, Supra, in which a workman was held to be a busi-
ness visitor even though at the time of his injury he was 
engaged in retrieving his hat from an area outside of the 
place he had been working. The court in that case found 
sufficient benefit to the property owner. In the present 
case, there were many facts from which a jury could have 
found that defendant benefited from Droubay and his em-
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ployees using the washing facilities. Among those facts 
are the following : 
1. Droubay's trucks were painted with defendant's 
colors and trade name and he had been specifically instruc-
ted by defendant's sales department that these trucks 
should be kept clean (R. 117). The use of Droubay's trucks 
on the highways undoubtedly provided defendant with a 
source of advertising. To the uninformed, these trucks, for 
all purposes, appear to be those of the defendant. If they 
were maintained in a dirty and unkempt condition, it would 
reflect upon defendant's reputation. Defendant was thus 
clearly benefited by Droubay's having a convenient place to 
wash and care for his trucks. Having facilities in defend-
ant's yard made it possible for Droubay to clean his trucks 
in the same area as he maintained his office and where 
the trucks were parked and loaded. 
2. Droubay was a consignee and distributor of de-
fendant's products (R. 90). There was a close business re-
lationship between them (R. 33). He was defendant's dis-
tributing agent, and the maintenance of a friendly and 
amicable relation between them was important to both. 
Defendant was able to favor Droubay by making this area 
available for his use. Had it not felt that some benefit 
would be derived by allowing this use by him, it had ample 
opportunity to object to its being so used. The use of the 
wash ramp admittedly saved Droubay money, and the ef-
ficiency of his operations were no doubt improved since he 
would otherwise have had to pay to have his trucks cleaned 
some distance away. A manufacturer is obviously bene-
fited by the continued successful operation of its distribu· 
i 
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tor's business since the marketing of its products are de-
pendent upon such distributors. 
3. Droubay was a lessee of the defendant's property 
(R. 84). Rent was paid directly, or as a credit against the 
purchase of the building Droubay rented, to defendant. A 
lessor is naturally benefited by the satisfied use of his 
property by its lessee. The providing of this ramp made 
the leased premises that much more attractive and useful 
to Droubay. 
All of the above factors lead to only one conclusion-
defendant was clearly and unmistakably benefited by the 
use of the washing ramp or platform by Droubay or his 
employees. This, coupled with the implied invitation, tacit 
permission and long acquiescence, furnishes abundant evi-
dence to support a finding that plaintiff was a business visi-
tor upon defendant's property at the time he was injured. 
The jury in this case so found upon instructions clearly and 
correctly stating the law of this State. The evidence not 
only sufficiently, but conclusively, supported this finding. 
(b) Defendant violated the duty of care 
owed to one in plaintiff's status. 
The duty of care owed to a business visitor or invitee is 
the highest standard of care imposed upon a land owner. 
Not only has an owner the duty to warn the business visitor 
of known hazards or to avoid from actively harming him, 
but he is required by law to inspect and maintain his prem-
ises in a reasonably safe condition or to warn the visitor 
of any dangerous conditions so that he might conduct him-
self safely thereon. 
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1 
I l 
The Restatement of the Law of Torts, after setting 
forth the general liability of the land possessor to all 
licenseees whether business visitors or gratuitous licensees, 
states in Section 343 the special liability to a business 
visitor: 
"A possessor of land is subject to liability for 
bodily harm caused to business visitors by a natural 
or artificial condition thereon, if but only if, he 
" (a) knows, or by the exercise of reasonable 
care could discover, the condition which, if known , 
to him, he should realize as involving an unreason-
able risk to them, and " 
"(b) has no reason to believe that they will 
discover the condition or realize the risk involved 
therein, and 
" (c) invites or permits them to enter or re-
main upon the land without exercising reasonable 
care 
"' (i) to make the condition reasonably 
safe, or 
"' (ii) to give a warning adequate to en-
able them to avoid the harm without relinquish-
ing any of the services which they are entitled 
1 
to receive, if the possessor is a public utility'." .. 
In discussing what a business visitor is entitled to ex-
pect, Comment (d) to the above section provides at page 
942: 
"A business visitor is entitled to expect that the 
possessor will take reasonable care to ascer~ain t~e 
actual condition of the premises and, havmg diS· 
covered it, either to make it reasonably safe by re-
pair or to give warning of the actual condition and 
the risk involved therein." 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
21 
As noted supra, the provisions of the Restatement on 
this subject have been adopted by this Court. See In re 
Wimmer's Estate, Supra, at page 452 in which the above 
section is quoted and approved. 
The defendant, Phillips Petroleum Company, main-
tained on its property, next to the ramp used for washing 
trucks, a vat containing a hot caustic soda solution (R. 
60). This ramp is barely wide enough for a truck of the 
type involved to be parked thereon and still leave room for 
a man using the steam cleaning equipment to walk around 
it (R. 102, 125, 155). The caustic soda vat is located 
just 2 inches from the edge of this ramp and stood from 
13 to 14 inches above the surface of the ramp (R. 139). 
There would be less than 2 feet between a truck parked on 
the ramp, in the usual position, and the edge of this vat. 
There were other tanks and objects usually littering this 
area (R. 127). Defendant knew, when it purchased these 
premises, that this ramp was used for steam cleaning trucks 
and continued to so use it for the same purpose (R. 58, 59). 
Despite this knowledge, after acquiring this property, de-
fendant constructed or placed this vat in this hazardous 
location (R. 60). One operating the steam cleaning equip-
ment, which is located on the opposite side of the ramp 
than the vat, would normally be unable, from that location, 
to see the vat because of the truck. Droubay himself did 
not see the vat on the day in question (R. 74). The steam 
cleaning equipment, when in operation, greatly affected 
the vision of one using it (R. 131). The defendant was re-
quired by law to make its premises safe for those making 
a customary and reasonable use of such equipment. 
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The vat did have a cover attached to it when visited 
several months after the accident. No one testified that 
this cover was attached to the vat at the time plaintiff was 
injured (R. 74). Even if the cover was attached, someone 
had left it open on the day in question. Plaintiff or his 
employer never used or had occasion to use this vat (R. 
61). It was used exclusively by defendant's employees in 
cleaning pump parts. If the cover was attached, the jury 
clearly was warranted in finding that one of defendant's 
employees had carelessly left it open on the morning of 
January 18, 1952, or prior thereto. 
The argument that this vat was plainly visible to one 
using the area ignores the use to which this concrete ramp 
or platform was put and the nature of the vat and its 
contents. The ramp, as previously noted, was used for 
steam cleaning trucks and the vision of those so using it 
was normally impaired to some extent by the steam. Second-
ly, even had one observed the vat, he would not have been 
aware of its highly dangerous contents. Defendant's con-
duct must be considered in the light of its knowledge as to 
the use made of the ramp. 
The question of whether or not defendant violated the 
above described duty of care was clearly one for the jury. 
The jury, in finding for the plaintiff, necessarily concluded 
that defendant had failed to live up to this standard in 
maintaining an open vat of caustic soda in an area where 
men were known to be working with steam cleaning equip-
ment. The basic factor in determining whether or not a 
given act or course of conduct constitutes negligence is 
whether the risk of harm outweighs the utility of such 
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conduct. Prosser on Torts, Sec. 35. The alternatives avail-
able to the defendant are important in this respect. Here the 
defendant's conduct created a very great risk of the most 
serious and painful type of harm to those working in the 
area. While this v.at was no doubt useful and possibly neces-
' sary to the conduct of defendant's business, its utility would 
not have been materially affected by altering its location so 
as to place it outside of the area where persons using the 
wash ramp would be likely to step or stumble into it. Even 
assuming there was ne other convenient place to locate such 
a vat, there was nothing to prevent the defendant from 
erecting some type of barrier or fence around the vat or at 
least posting conspicuous signs or warnings so those using 
the area would be appraised of the vat's presence and its 
contents. The defendant's position that to post signs or 
to erect a barrier would have been a useless act is com-
.Pletely untenable. Had there been a conspicuous sign 
posted, the plaintiff could easily have been warned of this 
hazard when he drove onto the ramp. The argument that 
plaintiff would have been more seriously injured had he 
stumbled into a barrier ignores the fact that plaintiff's 
injuries were not caused by a fall or stumble, but by the 
acid in the vat. Defendant had never given Droubay or 
his employees any instructions or warnings regarding the 
vat, or when it might be in use and the lid open (R. 75-76). 
The case was submitted to the jury on the theory that 
if and only if plaintiff was a business visitor could recovery 
be allowed. This was the issue framed by the pleadings and 
the issue on which the trial proceeded. The appellant lays 
great stress on the contention that if plaintiff were a li-
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censee, the defendant would have violated no duty of care. 
The tenor of this argument seems to concede that if plain-
tiff were a business visitot, defendant did violate the 
standard of care owed to him. One pages 20 and 21 of 
appellant's brief reference is made to the Restatement of 
the Law of Torts' provisions as to the duty owed to the 
licensee. The portion cited, however, is not the section 
of the Restatement, but only two paragraphs from the com-
ment thereunder. So that this Court might be fully advised 
on the subject, Section 342 of the Restatement of the Law 
of Torts reads as follows: 
"A possessor of land is subject to liability for 
bodily harm caused to gratuitous licensees by a 
natural or artificial condition thereon if, but only 
if, he 
"(a) knows of the condition and realizes that 
it involves an unreasonable risk to them and has 
reason to believe that they will not discover the con-
dition or realize the risk, and 
"(b) invites or permits them to enter or re-
main upon the land, without exercising reasonable 
care 
" ' ( i) to make the condition reasonably 
safe, or 
"' (ii) to warn them of the condition and 
the risk involved therein'." 
There was no doubt under the evidence in this case 
that defendant knew of the caustic soda vat and of its 
location next to the washing ramp. The jury might reason-
ably have inferred that defendant also knew that it created 
an unreasonable risk to one using the steam cleaning equip-
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ment on said ramp and that such a person might not dis-
cover the condition or realize the risk involved. It is also 
clear that defendant did nothing to either make this con-
dition reasonably safe (on the contrary the lid was left 
open) or to warn the plaintiff of the condition and the 
risk involved therein. While the land owner owes the li-
censee no duty to inspect the premises to discover defects, 
there is a duty to protect or warn against known dangerous 
conditions. The comment to the above section in the Re-
statement contains many similar illustrations of conditions 
under which the land owner may be liable to a licensee. 
Thus, had plaintiff been deemed a licensee, recovery might 
still have been justified. Even if plaintiff had been deemed 
a trespasser, which no construction of the facts in this 
case would justify, liability might still have been predi-
cated on the rationale of this Court in Martin v. Jones, 
... Utah ... , 253 P. 2d 359 (1953). The fact remains 
however, that the only issue raised by the pleadings and at 
the trial was whether the plaintiff was a business visitor. 
The question raised by appellant in Point I of its brief 
is whether or not this case was properly submitted to the 
jury. If under any fair construction of the evidence in the 
record, the jury was warranted in finding that defendant 
was a business visitor and that defendant had violated 
the standard of care owed to such a person, then the judg-
ment of the trial court must stand. In determining a ques-
tion of this kind, the Supreme Court must view the evi-
dence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. In Els-
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wood v. Oregon Short Line Railroad Company, 82 Utah 
235, 23 P. 2d 925, 927 (1933), this Court stated: 
"In deciding the questions of whether or not a 
nonsuit should have been granted or a verdict direct-
ed for the defendant we must view the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the plaintiff. In testing 
the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to those 
questions the defendant stands in the position of 
admitting the truth of the plaintiff's evidence, and 
all reasonable inferences which the jury might fair-
ly draw therefrom favorable to the plaintiff." 
POINT II. 
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT GUILTY OF CONTRI-
BUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF 
LAW. 
Before the issue of contributory negligence may be 
taken from the jury and the plaintiff be deemed guilty 
of contributory negligence as a matter of law, the defend-
ant's burden of proving both that plaintiff was negligent 
and that such negligence proximately contributed to cause 
his injury must be met and established with such certainty 
that reasonable minds could not find to the contrary. If 
there is any reasonable basis, either because of lack of 
evidence, or from the evidence and the fair inferences 
arising therefrom, taken in the light most favorable to plain-
tiff, upon which reasonable minds may conclude that they 
are not convinced by a preponderance of the evidence either 
that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence or that 
such negligence was a proximate cause of the injury, the 
question must be submitted to the jury. Martin v. Stevens, 
.. Utah ... , 243 P. 2d 747, 749 (1952). Under the evi-
dence presented in this case, it would clearly have been 
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error for the trial court to have concluded that plaintiff 
was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. 
It is academic that in determining whether or not 
plaintiff was negligent at the time he was injured the 
standard used is that of a reasonable man under all of the 
circumstances. Prosser on Torts, Section 36. It isn't a 
question of how a reasonable man would have conducted 
himself on this washing ramp on an average day with no 
obstruction to his vision. The question is rather what a 
reasonable man steam cleaning his employer's truck on a 
January day, with clouds of white steam being emitted 
from the nozzle in his hands, would have done. His exper-
ience in using the equipment and his knowledge of the area 
must also be considered. 
The plaintiff testified that he did not observe the vat 
when he drove the truck onto the washing ramp (R. 127). 
For that matter, neither did Droubay observe the vat on 
that particular day (R. !'4). There was evidence as to why 
plaintiff did not see it. It was the first time he had been 
in the vicinity of the ramp (R. 127). He was required by 
his employer to watch closely to his left to protect de-
fendant's property; there were objects and trash in the 
area that tended to obstruct his view (R. 126, 127, 142). 
Even had he seen it, which he did not, he would not have 
known the hazard<?us nature of its contents (R. 127). After 
returning from lunch and beginning to work on the truck, 
his employer started the equipment and cleaned part of the 
truck (R. 69, 70) . Plaintiff had never used this type of 
equipment before (R. 127). The nozzle sent forth a large 
spray and cloud of steam (R. 131). Indeed, that was the 
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purpose of the equipment, the reason it was there and the 
use normally made of the ramp. As the plaintiff cleaned 
around the truck and while the steam from the equipment 
and from the vat obscured his vision, but while he could 
still feel the side of the truck against his right hip, he 
struck his left leg against the side of the vat, causing him 
to fall forward, and in order to regain his balance, lifted 
his left leg over the edge and stepped into the vat. 
Defendant lays great stress on the fact that had plain-
tiff turned the nozzle into the air and to one side and waited 
for the steam to clear, he could have observed the tank. 
The fact that there was an alternative available does not 
answer the question. The jury in this case found, and 
justly so, that it was not unreasonable for the defendant to 
have proceeded around the truck as he did, operating the 
equipment and keeping his hip against the fender of the 
truck. The fact that he could have moved the nozzle does 
not mean that it was unreasonable for him not to have done 
so. This was a question for the jury. The jury could have 
well concluded that plaintiff was entitled to assume that 
the ramp and the area immediately surrounding it was 
reasonably suited and maintained for doing the work the 
defendant knew was per~ormed thereon. In this respect, 
Comment (d) to Section 343 of the Restatement of Torts 
is enlightening: 
"A business visitor is entitled to expect that the 
possessor will take reasonable care to ascertain the 
actual condition of the premises and, having dis-
covered it, either to make it reasonably safe by re-
pair or to give warning of the actual condition and 
the risk involved therein. Therefore, a business 
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visitor is not required to be on the alert to discover 
defects which, if he were a bare licensee, entitled to 
expect nothing but notice of known defects, he might 
be negligent in not discovering. This is of import-
ance in determining whether the visitor is or is not 
guilty of contributory negligence in failing to dis-
cover a defect, as well as in determining whether the 
defect is one of which the possessor should believe 
that his visitor would not discover and as to which, 
therefore, he must use reasonable care to warn the 
visitor." 
If it is found, as the jury' did in this case, that plaintiff 
was a business visitor upon the defendant's premises, then 
plaintiff is entitled to assume that the defendant has made 
the premises safe for the purpose for which the plaintiff 
is to use tl~m. 38 Am. Jur., Negligence, § 199, p. 879, See 
Larkin v. Saltair Beach Co., 30 Utah 86, 101, 83 Pac. 686 
(1905). 
Defendant relies upon the decision of this Court in 
Knox v. Snow, ... Utah ... , 229 P. 2d 874 (1951), which 
is clearly distinguishable from the case at hand. Plain-
tiff in the Knox case fell into the grease pit at a service 
station. In that case while the area was somewhat shaded 
- and this was doubted - the plaintiff's vision was not 
impaired as a result of his reasonably using the premises 
for the very purpose for which he was invited upon the 
property and for the purpose for which the area was de-
signed and used, as in the present case. Further, in tbe 
Knox case, the plaintiff was clearly aware of obstructions 
in the area and had in fact stepped over some. The plain-
tiff in that case was observing other objects in the room 
rather than watching where he was proceeding; he was 
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familiar with the type of premises across which he was 
walking and knew that such pits were commonly located 
in such places. None of those factors were present in this 
case. The plaintiff in the present case was not familiar 
with the area where he was injured and his vision was im-
paired by the steam 'cleaning equipment he was using. 
See Martin v. Jones, Supra, at'page 361 in which the K1w.r 
case is distinguished on the same grounds set forth above. 
The pronouncement of this Court in Baker v. Decker, 
Utah ... , 212 P. 2d 679 (1949), answers defendant's 
argument on this point. The plaintiff in that case was a 
woman who resided in an apartment house. While leaving 
her apartment one morning, she noticed that a painter and 
house cleaner was working in the hall and that certain 
equipment and a ruffled, uneven canvas, was on the floor. 
She saw the canvas and yet as she stepped onto it caught 
her right heel in a fold or wrinkle and tripped and fell. 
The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff and defendant ap-
pealed contending that plaintiff was guilty of contributory 
negligence as a matter of law, since she was aware of the 
danger and could have taken an alternate route. In re-
.jecting this contention, this Court quoted Tillotson v. City 
of Davenport, 232 Iowa, 44, 4 N. W. 2d 365, 366: 
"It is well settled that mere knowledge that a 
walk is dangerous, unsafe for travel, is not sufficient 
to establish contributory negligence though there is 
another way that is safe and convenient, and to de-
feat recovery it must appear that the traveler knew ' 
or as an ordinarily cautious person should have · 
known that it was imprudent to use the walk." 
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Justice Latimer, speaking for the Court, further stated: 
"The last contention to be disposed of deals 
with the claim that plaintiff was guilty of contri-
butory negligence in stepping onto the canvas and 
catching her heel. We must keep in mind that the 
burden is upon the defendant to establish this claim 
and that unless all reasonable minds must conclude 
that Mrs. Baker was negligent in the manner in 
which she attempted to get over the canvas the ques-
tion of her due care must be submitted to the jury 
for determination. We must also keep in mind that 
this case falls within the category of cases dealing 
with pedestrians who are subjected to unnecessary 
hazards by the thoughtless conduct of others. Ord-
inary reasonable persons will trip over objects, 
stumble over obstructions, slip on slick surfaces and 
fall into holes or excavations. Even though they may 
see the object they sometimes fail to comprehend 
and anticipate the incident which precipitates the 
injury. Usually whether a reasonable person would 
have properly appraised the situation and escaped 
injury is for a jury to determine. * * * 
"The many variable factors to be considered in 
this type of case are such that standard of due care 
should be determined by the triers of the facts and 
not by the court. The jury having found the issues 
of negligence and contributory negligence in favor 
of plaintiff and against defendant, the verdict and 
judgment are affirmed." 
It should be noted that the above decision requires that 
J plaintiff comprehend and anticipate the incident which pre-
- cipitates the injury. It isn't enough that he sees and 
recognizes some danger in the situation. Clearly the plain-
-- tiff in this case did not comprehend and anticipate a hazard 
such as caused his injury. 
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In a recent decision of the United States Court of Ap.. 
peals, Tenth Circuit, in a case arising in Utah, the question 
of contributory negligence was considered in the business 
visitor situation. Swift and Company v. Schuster, 192 F. 
2d 615 (lOth Cir. 1951). A government meat inspector at 
appellant's plant was injured when he stepped down from 
a platform 22 inches high on which he was standing and 
slipped and fell on the wet, greasy floor. Defendant ap-
pealed from a judgment for plaintiff contending that plain-
tiff was guilty of contributory negligence and had assumed 
the risk. There were alternative means theplaintiff could 
have used to accomplish his purpose. In affirming the trial 
court and after distinguishing the case of Knox v. Snow, 
Supra, the Court stated at page 618: 
"We think the test to be applied in this case is 
laid down by the Supreme Court in M osheuvel v. 
District of Colymbia, 191 U. S. 247, 24 S. Ct. 57, 63, 
48 L. Ed. 170. In that case the plaintiff, in descend-
ing to the street, attempted to step over an uncov- I 
ered water-box in the sidewalk and was injured. 
There were ways .availa?le for her to walk ar?und 1 the water-box on either side. She was fully cogmzant ' 
of the situation and had used the sidewalk on many I 
occasions, sometimes walking around the box and 
sometimes stepping over it. In reversing the 1 lower court barring recovery, on the ground that I 
she had knowingly and wilfully assumed the risk, ~ 
the Supreme Court said: 'Coming to apply such · 
principle, the question is this, was the situation of 
the water-box and the hazard to result from ~n .at- I 
tempt to step over it so great that the plambff, 
with the knowledge of the situation, could not, as a I 
reasonably prudent person, have elected to step , 
across the box, instead of stepping to the sidewalk 
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from either side of the tread of the last step? And 
this, we think, was, under the undisputed proof, a 
question for the jury, and not for the court.' See 
also McCready v. Southern Pac. Co., 9 Cir. 26 F. 2d 
569 and 9 Cir., 47 F. 2d 673. 
"Applying these principles to the case in hand, 
we conclude that the question of plaintiff's contri-
butory negligence was properly submitted to the 
jury and that its verdict and the judgment entered 
thereon must be affirmed." 
The facts in the above case were much more favorable 
_ to the defendant than in the present case since the plain-
tiff there had used the area many times previously and 
was familiar with the condition causing his injury and 
had knowledge of its presence. In this case there was un-
contradicted evidence to the effect that plaintiff did not 
see the caustic soda vat and that his failure to see it and 
recognize the danger was not due to . negligent conduct on 
his part. 
On the question of when a trial judge should take the 
.- question of contributory negligence from the jury, the law 
- in this state is settled. In the recently decided case of 
- Stickle v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., . . . Utah ... , 251 
P. 2d 867, 870 (1952) this Court, in reversing the decision 
"' of the trial court in granting a Motion to Dismiss on the 
.. ~ ground that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, 
reviewed and summarized the authoritiies as follows : 
"The authorities frequently state that the ques-
tion of contributory negligence is usually for the 
jury. And that this is so wherever the evidence is 
such that reasonable minds may differ as to its ex-
istence has been stated innumerable times, which is 
undoubtedly correct. However, in view of the fact 
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that before the issue may be taken from the jury, 
the defendant has the burden of establishing plain-
tiff's negligence by a preponderance of the evidence 
it may be a bit more precise to state that the ques-
tion of contributory negligence is for the jury when-
ever the evidence is such that jurors, acting fairly 
and reasonably, may say that they are not con-
vinced by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
plaintiff was guilty of negligence which proximately 
contributed to cause his own injury. 
* * * 
"These principles apply in identical fashion to 
the question of plaintiff's contributory negligence 
except that the defendant has the burden of proof. 
That the evidence is such that the jury may find 
from a preponderance of the evidence that the 
plaintiff failed to use due care for his own safety 
is not sufficient. The proof must establish his 
failure to do so with such certainty that all reason-
able minds must conclude before the court may rule 
as a matter of law that he is precluded from recov-
ery on that ground. The court should exercise cau-
tion and forbearance in considering taking questions 
of fact from the jury." 
See also: 
Newton v. Oregon Short Line Railroad Co., 
43 Utah 219, 134 Pac. 567 (1913); 
Martin v. Stevens, ... Utah ... , 243 P. 2d : 
747, 749 (1952). 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN THE 
EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE. 
The only question raised as to admissibility of evi· 
dence relates to certain portions of the testimony in the 
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deposition of plaintiff taken prior to trial. Defendant 
sought to tender this evidence at the trial for the purpose 
of showing "some inconsistency" in his testimony or ad-
missions on the part of the plaintiff. Objection was made to 
the admission of said evidence on the ground that it was 
repetitious and that it was not contradictory of anything 
to which plaintiff had testified. The substance of the testi-
mony offered was to the effect that plaintiff could see the 
parts of the truck being cleaned by moving the nozzle away, 
raising it up in the air and waiting a short while; that the 
steam was directed towards the under-carriage o~ the truck 
at the time of the accident and that by turning the steam 
into the air he could have seen the fender next to his hip 
and that if he had raised the nozzle above his head he prob-
ably could have seen his surroundings. 
Appellant relies upon Rule 26 (d) U. R. C. P. stating 
that the same permits the deposition of a party to be used 
by an adverse party for any purpose. It must first be 
noted however, that what is said in Rule 26 (d) (2) is 
necessarily qualified by the general introductory statement 
in Rule 26 (d) that makes a deposition admissible at trial 
only "so far as admissible under the rules of evidence." 
See Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, 
§ 655, Vol. 2, p. 346. Thus if the evidence sought to be in-
troduced was inadmissible under the rules of evidence, then 
it gains no hallowed stature merely because it was embodied 
in the deposition of a party. It should also be noted that 
Rule 26 (e) allows objection to be made at the trial to re-
ceiving in evidence any deposition or part thereof for any 
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reason which would require its exclusion if the witness were 
testifying. 
The appellant implies in its brief that the trial court 
sustained the objection to certain portions of the plaintiff's 
deposition without knowing the content thereof. The line 
of testimony thus far however, had already revealed its sub-
stance. While the objection was sustained in the presence of 
the jury, the Court, during the recess, listened to the pro-
ferred evidence and again reaffirmed its position (R. 170-
172). ~ 
The evidence sought to be admitted by tendering the 
deposition was evidence the Court previously had excluded 
on cross-examination as repetitious (R. 170). If the trial 
court was correct in excluding the evidence offered from the 
witness on cross-examination, then clearly under the pro-
visions of the Rules of Civil Procedure, above noted, the de-
position was likewise properly refused. The evidence was ob-
jected to on cross-examination as being repetitious and in no 
way contradictory. An examination of· the record shows 
this to be true. As noted above, the substance of the testi-
mony2 the exclusion of which appellant complains of on 
pages 36 to 38 of its brief, is that by moving the nozzle in 
another direction a person could, at least to some extent, 
see the area in which he was working. On direct examin-
ation plaintiff had testified as follows: 
"A. Then I tried to ciean this truck, the back 
dual wheel on the outside of the wheel it was very 
sticky, I ~ould keep the nozzle very close to it to 
make the steam efficient; it didn't clean it when 
you hold it far away. 
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"Then I went over to the left front wheel, 
cleaned the outside of that wheel, cleaned the in-
side of that front wheel, across the front axle, I 
cleaned the inside of the front wheel the best I could, 
taking the no.z.zle azcay and putting it back down 
again. 
"Q. Standing in front of the truck at that 
time? 
"A. Yes, sir, bending over, looking at the 
wheel, and pouring the steam, and then I took the· 
nozzle away from the inside of the front wheel 
several times and put it back to give it a little bit 
more cleaning" (R. 132) . 
On cross-examination defendant's counsel had ques-
-- tioned the witness and read portions of plaintiff's deposi-
·- tion to the following effect : 
"Q. This steam, that obscured your vision, is 
steam that came from this nozzle you were using, 
was it not? 
"A. Part of it was, yes. 
"Q. Was there any part came from any other 
source? 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. Where was that? 
"A. It came from underneath the truck from 
the northeast around the side of the front wheel 
where I had been cleaning, the steam was coming 
off of cold metal. 
"Q. Before the steam cleared away, you moved 
around the area where you had no visibility? 
''A. Poor visibility all around me there. 
"Q. When you started to clean around in the 
front of the truck, hmv could you tell whether or 
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not the part you had been cleaning, or the under-
carriage had been sufficiently cleaned? 
"A. I knew if I waited a minute the steam 
would clear, and put steam on it again and more or 
less take it for granted the last dose I had given 
enough to have it cleaned. 
"Q. As you handed this nozzle to the under-
carriage, you turned it to one side, you turned the 
steam nozzle away and looked at the part you were 
working on? 
"A. Some of the time turned it up in the air and 
waited for the steam to disappear. 
"Q. That is right. How often did you turn it 
up in the .air? 
"A. After you had gone over quite an area. 
"Q. You turned it up in the air so the steam 
would clear out of your vision? 
"A. I don't know; I didn't know too much 
about handling this ; I don't know how often I turn-
ed it up in the air. 
"Q. Mr. Droubay had demonstrated to you 
how to work, had he not? 
"A. I watched him, I imagine you could call 
it 'deriwnstration. 
"Q. As you walked, or as you moved toward 
the south, were you as you moved toward the south, 
able to see anything as you hit the tank with your 
foot? 
"A. I was trying to move toward the west. 
"Q. As you moved toward the front, you had 
to move toward the front to get to the west, didn't 
you? 
"A. About one step to the south. 
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"Q. Could you see to the west? 
"A. No, I can't remember as I could. 
"Q. Well, wasn't the steam so thick at that 
time you couldn't see where you were going? 
"A. Well, it was very dense, hard to see, I 
imagine you could see, it was difficult to see where 
I was going, very difficult. 
"Q. Wasn't it because Mr. Rogalsky [sic], you 
turned this steam nozzle down to your left just before 
you moved over to the tank? 
* * * 
"A. No, sir. Immediately after I pulled the 
nozzle, I had looked and seen the wheel through a 
fog and seen some sticky grease being removed, some 
was loose and going to be removed, a hose would 
take it off; I took it off and gave it another little 
shot and took the nose off the front wheel and I 
don't know whether I put it up in the air and started 
to walk around; I knew it was the fender. I could 
feel it with my elbow and hip, and I wanted to get 
done before the day was over. 
"Q. Is it your testimony you did not turn the 
steam hose down to your left in the direction of that 
tank? 
"A. I don't remember, sir. 
* * * 
"MR. REIMAN : I want to show what he testi-
fied on the desposition, Your Honor, how he held 
the steam nozzle,- how it pulled it away from the part · 
he was working on. He said he assumed it was clean, 
and I want to go on. May I? 
"THE COURT: You may. 
"Q. (by Mr. Reiman) Line 22: 
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"Q. You mentioned that the steam ob-
scured your view a little. How were you able 
to tell what parts had been satisfactorily clean-
ed? 
"A. I would move the steam cleaning noz-
zle away from that area, and look at it. If it 
was not clean I would put it back. 
"Q. You so testified, did you not on deposition? 
"A. I guess I did. 
"Q. So that your vision was obstructed or ob-
scured only in the direction in which you were shoot-
ing the steam; is that it? 
"A. Yes, in that direction, and in and about 
that direction or area, it was rather tall and it took 
in quite an area * * *" (R. 165-167-169, 170). 
(Emphasis added.) 
I 
The portion of the record quoted above was already 
before the jury for its consideration. Counsel for defend-
ant were seeking to argue the possible inferences to be 
drawn from this testimony by having it continually re-
peated. The evidence was sufficiently before the jury to 
form a basis for any argument defendant may have wished 
to make from it without the necessity of such repetition. 
An examination of the above quotations from the 
record clearly shows that the information sought to be 
shown by the excluded evidence set forth on pages 36 to 
38 of appellant's brief had at least twice previously been 
given by the witness. The portions which defendant sought 
to introduce from the deposition added nothing to what 
was already before the jury. It was entirely within the 
trial court's discretion to refuse the presentation of this 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
41 
evidence for the third or fourth time. That the trial judge 
has discretion to exclude cumulative or repetitious evidence 
is well settled. 
"The Court may properly prevent a witness 
from repeating testimony which he has already giv-
en." 53 Am. J ur., Trial, Section 106. 
In accord see : 
Parry v. Harris, 93 Utah 317, 320, 72 P. 2d 
1044 (1937) ; 
Litt v. Litt, 75 Cal. App. 2d 242, 170 P. 2d 684 
(1946) ; . 
Minder v. Rowley, 35 Wash. 2d 92, 211 P. 2d 
170 (1949); 
Klinginsmith v. Allen, 155 Neb. 674, 53 N. W. 
2d 77 (1953). 
Apart from the discretionary authority of the trial 
judge to exclude such repetitious evidence, it is clear that 
:: since the substance of the evidence was already before the 
jury the defendant could not possibly have been prejudiced 
by its exclusion. 
.· . 
. •: 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN IN-
STRUCTING THE JURY OR IN REFUSING 
TO SUBMIT DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTIONS. 
The main contention made by the defendant as to the 
instructions of the trial court to the jury relate to its re-
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fusal to give defendant's requested Instructions No. 1-10 
as submitted. Defendant's requested Instruction No. 1 is 
largely a statement of what defendant's theory as to the 
case was, and in substance was covered by Instructions No. 
2 and No. 10 given by the trial court. Defendant's re-
quested Instruction No. 2 merely repeats certain evidentiary 
matter defendant had offered in evidence. This evidence 
was before the jury and did not warrant a specific instruc-
tion. 
Substantial portions of defendant's requested instruc-
tions relating to the definition of and duty of care owed to 
a business visitor or invitee were embodied within the 
court's Instructions No.· 10 and 11, which correctly in-
structed the jury in accordance with the law of this state. 
In re Wimmer's Estate, 111 Utah 444, 182 P. 2d 119 (1947); 
Skerl v. Willow Creek Coal Company, 92 Utah 474, 69 P. 
2d 502 (1937). The instructions given by the trial court 
in this case are in complete accord with the instructions 
approved by this Court in the above cases and the prin-
ciples stated therein. Appellant fails to point out any 
error in the instructions given by the Court, or is it ser-
iously contended that said instructions do not correctly 
state the law. 
The balance of defendant's requested instructions all 
relate to the standard of care owed to one who is not a 
bu~iness visitor. The principal contention made by appel-
lant is that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the 
jury, as requested by defendant, on the definition of a li-
censee and trespasser and the duty of care owed to such 
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persons. Appellant cQntends that the instructions took 
from the jury one of the primary issues in the lawsuit since 
there was evidence from which the jury could have found 
that plaintiff was a gratuitous licensee or even a trespasser. 
As noted earlier in this brief, there may have been suf-
ficient evidence offered to support a finding that plaintiff 
was a licensee or trespasser, and also that defendant had 
violated the duty of care owed to such a person. Even 
assuming this, it is difficult to conceive how the defend-
ant in this case could have been prejudiced by the failure 
of the Court to so instruct. The issue which defendant 
refers to as being "primary" was not even raised by the 
pleadings in the case or at the trial. The trial court isn't 
required to instruct the jury on every possible alternative 
in a case. 
The jury was instructed as to the duty of care owed 
to a business visitor which is concededly the highest stand-
ard of care imposed on a landowner, but the burden placed 
upon the plaintiff to bring himself within the category of 
a business visitor is likewise the most difficult to meet. 
The jury was clearly and specifically instructed by the 
Court in its Instruction No. 5 (R. 247) that: 
"If you find from the evidence that the defend-
ant was not negligent, or that plaintiff was not a 
business visitor of defendant, or that the plaintiff 
was guilty of contributory negligence, as the term 
is elsewhere defined for you, then your verdict shall 
be for the defendant, no cause of action" (Emphasis 
added). 
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Under this instruction it was mandatory that the jury 
first find that plaintiff was a business visitor before re-
covery could be allowed. 
Precisely the same contention made by the defendant 
in this case as to the trial court's failure to instruct on its 
theory that plaintiff was a licensee or trespasser has been 
previously considered and answered by this Court. Skerl 
V. Willow Creek Coal Company, 92 Utah 474, 69 P. 2d 502 
(1937). In that case, while there was no specific request 
made by the defendant at trial for instructions as to the 
other categories, the same argument was made on appeal 
as appellant makes in its brief. On pages 484 this Court 
stated: 
"Under the instructions a verdict for plaintiff 
indicates that the jury could not have found other 
than the plaintiff was a invitee or permitee, which 
of necessity negatives the position of her being a 
trespasser. The main point for the jury to determine 
was whether the plaintiff was an invitee. The jury 
were instructed that, if plaintiff was not an invited 
person, she was not entitled to recover. It would 
have tended to confuse the issues and the jury to 
have added instructions as to licensees and tres-
passers." 
In any event, the instructions requested by the de-
fendant did not correctly state or apply the law. A detailed 
examination of said instructions reveal that in neither sub-
stance or effect do they state the law of this state, or that 
se forth in the Restatement of the Law of Torts, as to the 
liability of a landowner to a licensee. The appellant's con-
tention that there was no evidence to support the instruc· 
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tions as to business visitors is answered earlier in this brief 
under Point I where the various factors are enumerated 
from which a jury could have and did find that plaintiff 
was a business visitor. 
The instructions given by the trial court in this case 
clearly presented to the jury the issues raised by the evi-
dence. It is respectfully submitted that the defendant, under 
no view of the case, could have been prejudiced by the trial 
court's failure to give instructions as to the liability owed 
to a licensee or trespasser. Instructions to that effect were 
not warranted under the issues raised by the pleadings and 
would have only tended to confuse the jury. The instruc-
tions as given gave the defendant every advantage possible 
under the evidence introduced. 
POINT V. 
THERE WAS NO DEFECT IN PARTIES -
THIS ACTION WAS AUTHORIZED BY AND 
BROUGHT IN BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF 
AND THE STATE INSURANCE FUND. 
Plaintiff filed this action, with the express approval 
and consent of the State Insurance Fund. Subsequent to 
defendant's filing its Motion to Dismiss and Make More 
Certain, plaintiff filed with the Court a letter addressed 
to plaintiff's counsel which states that a total of $416.52 
had been paid by the State Insurance Fund, part directly to 
the plaintiff and the balance to the hospital, and that: 
"You are authorized to represent the interest 
of the State Insurance Fund in attempting to pro-
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cure reimbursement to the fund for the amounts 
which the State Insurance Fund has been required 
to pay in this case, it being our understanding that 
Mr. Rogalski's accident was caused by the fault of 
a third party" (R. 9). 
This letter merely confirmed a prior understanding of 
the parties. It was filed in this action prior to the defend-
ant's answer and was before the Court when it heard and , 
denied defendant's Motion. The parties argued the question ' 
fully and after considering the matter, particularly the 
above letter, the trial court concluded that the State In-
surance Fund would be bound by the judgment in this case. 
It is defendant's contention that Section 35-1-65, U. 
C. A. (1953) required the State Insurance Fund to be 
named as a party plaintiff in the present action and that 
any cause of action was in said agency. The concluding 
paragraph to Point V of appellant's brief states that there 
is nothing to prevent the State Insurance Fund from main-
taining a separate action against the defendant. This, of 
course, is the only way defendant could be prejudiced by 
the alleged defect. 
Prior to 1945 this section provided that the employer 
or insurance carrier, having paid compensation, "shall be 
subrogated to the rights of such employee." Section 42-
1-58, U. C. A. (1943). It further provided that before 
being required to pay compensation, the employee could 
be required to make a written assignment of the cause of, 
action of the insurance carrier. Section 35-1-65, U. C. A. 
(1953), as now written, provides that if compensation is 
claimed and the employer or insurance carrier becomes ob-
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ligated to pay compensation, then said employer or l'arrier 
shall become trustee of the cause of action against the 
third party and may maintain the action either in its own 
name or the name of the injured employee. The present 
section has not been construed so as to indicate just what 
must exist between the employee and the insurance carrier 
- prior to the commencement of the action and what must 
- be shown in the proceedings as to said relationship. The 
- legislature, however, certainly did not intend to alter the 
- conclusion reached by the cases decided under the former 
section to the effect that the employee has a definite in-
terest in the cause of action and that if the insurance 
carrier waives any right under the cause of action or re-
fuses to prosecute said action, the employee may himself 
._ bring suit against the third party. It is likewise clear that 
there is but one cause of action against the third party. 
Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co., 107 Utah 114, 
152 P. 2d 98 (1944) ; 
Jay v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 150 F. 2d 
247 (lOth Cir. 1945) ; 
Cederloff v. Whited, 110 Utah 45, 169 P. 2d 
777 (1946). 
While in the Johanson case this Court stated that the 
failure to join the insurance carrier was at the most only 
a defect in parties that had been waived, the Court never-
theless made it clear that the injured employee (or as in 
that case the dependents of a deceased employee) was a 
real party in interest and where the carrier had waived its 
right to subrogation said party could properly bring suit 
to enforce the cause of action. In the Jay case, the United 
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States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that a de-
fective and invalid assignment of its cause of action by the 
insurance carrier to the injured employee nevertheless con-
stituted a waiver of the insurance carrier's right to sue and 
the employee could maintain the action in his own name. 
There is no possib~e reason why the letter on file in the pres-
ent case should not have the same effect. In the Cederloff 
case this Court relied on the Johanson opinion in reaching 
the conclusion in an analogous case that there was but one 
cause of action and that there was no danger of a second 
suit by the insurance carrier. 
While the 1945 amendment to this section no doubt 
was fostered by the insurance interests, one purpose of the 
amendment was to make it clear that there is but one cause 
of action against the third party. Certainly the legislature 
did not intend to bar recovery by the employee and shield 
the third party where the insurance carrier or the employer 
refused to bring an action or waived its right to do so. There 
is nothing to indicate that the legislature intended the in-
surance carrier to be named as a party plaintiff in every 
action brought under this section. The contrary is ex-
pressly provided. Section 35-1-65, U. C. A. (1953); see 
also Section 31-7-11, U. C. A. (1953). The parties will 
generally prefer to have the action brought in the name of 
the employee rather than be prejudiced by having the in-
surance company the named plaintiff. While it is no doubt 
true that there must be come authorization by the insurance 
carrier for the bringing of the action, the very language 
of the section contemplates that this authorization need 
not be manifested by the joinder of the carrier and em-
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ployee as plaintiff. Even though the section allows the 
carrier as trustee to bring suit in the name of the employee, 
the general law applicable to trusts would allow the bene-
ficiarly to sue in his own name when the trustee refused 
to prosecute the cause of action, or if the trustee conveyed 
or released his interest in the trust res to the beneficiary. 
Certainly, the letter by the State Insurance Fund should 
be given this effect. 
It is clear under the letter from the State Insurance 
Fund that they authorized the bringing of this action in 
the name of the employee. Both plaintiff and the State 
Insurance Fund consider themselves bound by the ultimate 
decision in this case. The interest of the State· Insurance 
Fund in any judgment recovered is set forth in said letter. 
It is clear under the authorities previously discussed that 
where the employee brings an action as here and recovers 
for the entire loss that he will hold in trust. for the in-
surance carrier, such portion of the recovery as belong to 
said carrier. See Annotation, 157 A. L. R. 1242 at p. 1252. 
It would be impossible, in light of the foregoing, for the 
State Insurance Fund to maintain another action .against 
this defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff was entitled to recover for the injuries which 
he sustained on defendant's premises. The issues of defend-
ant's and plaintiff's respective negligence were properly 
submitted to the jury and the jury was correctly instructed 
on the law applicable to the facts presented. A careful ex-
amination and consideration of the exceptions raised by 
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appellant's brief reveal no error in the trial of this case 
and certainly there were no prejudicial errors committed 
by the trial court. Under the authorities and arguments 
presented herein, the judgment in this case should be af-
firmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY, 
DAVID E. SALISBURY, 
MILTON A. OMAN, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
Receiveu.d ____ ,copies of the foregoing brief of re-
spondent this day of August, 1953. 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant 
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